Theoretical
Models
BOCYF:
New Research on Brain Development During the Adolescent Years One of the most
remarkable findings in neurobiology over the last decade is the extent of change
that can occur in the brain, even in the adult brain, as a function of the physical,
social, and intellectual environment. Starting in infancy and continuing into
later childhood, there is a period of exuberant synapse growth followed by a period
of synaptic “pruning” which is largely completed by puberty. Although, neuroscientists
have documented the time line of this synaptic waxing and waning, they are less
sure about what it means for changes in children’s and adolescents’ cognitive
development, behavior, intelligence, and capacity to learn. Generally, they point
to correlations between changes in synaptic density or numbers and observed changes
in behavior based on developmental and cognitive psychology. With new technologies
that permit analysis of living brains, the National Institutes of Health has just
released exciting new evidence about brain development that continues well into
the adolescent years. According to Jay Giedd from the National Institute on Mental
Health, advances in computers and mathematics and imaging technology now allow
scientists to examine the developing brain as never before. During key periods,
the amount of gray matter in some areas can nearly double within as little as
a year, followed by a correspondingly drastic loss of tissue as unneeded cells
are purged and the brain continues to organize itself. “The brain greatly overproduces
the number of brain cells and connections – more than could possibly survive.
And then there is a fierce battle amongst these cells and connections and only
a very small percentage of them make it. We knew this process occurred in the
womb and maybe for the first 19 months of life. But the big surprise was when
we actually started following the same child or children with sequential scans
as they were growing that there was a second wave of overproduction.” This process
of overproduction of individual brain cells which causes a thickening of gray
matter continues to increase, peaking around the time of puberty. With puberty,
there is a second “pruning’ of cells. This pruning process follows a “use it or
loose it’ principle – the cells and connections that are used are going to be
the ones that survive; those that aren’t will be the ones that perish. According
to Giedd, “the exciting news is that unlike infants whose brain activity is completely
determined by their parents and environment, the teens may actually be able to
control how their own brains are wired and sculpted.” This new scientific evidence
clearly has some important implications for how we think about pre-adolescent
and adolescent development. However, according to Elizabeth Sowell, a neuroscientists
from the University of California in Los Angeles, “I don’t think anybody has yet
figured out a way to make this clinically relevant… still, we’re all hoping that
perhaps experts in education or psychology will find ways to make those connections.”
"In
the 1960s, when I became a graduate student in linguistics, generative grammar
was the hot new topic. Everyone from philosophers to psychologists
to anthropologists to educators to literary theorists was reading about transformational
grammar. But by the late 1970s, the bloom was off the rose, although most
linguists didn’t realize it; and by the 1990s, linguistics was arguably far on
the periphery of the action in cognitive science. To some extent,
of course, such a decline in fortune was simply a matter of fashion and the arrival
of new methodologies such as connectionism and brain imaging. However, there
are deeper reasons for linguistics’ loss of prestige, some historical and some
scientific. The
goal [of Foundations of Language and his work in general. bd] is to integrate
linguistics with the other cognitive sciences, not to eliminate the insights achieved
by any of them. To understand language and the brain, we need all the tools
we can get. But everyone will have to give a little in order for the pieces
to fit together properly. [P]osition:
...the overall program of generative grammar was correct, as was the way this
program was intended to fit in with psychology and biology. However, a basic
technical mistake at the heart of the formal implementation, concerning the overall
role of syntax in the grammar, led to the theory being unable to make the proper
connections both within linguistic theory and with neighboring fields. Foundations
of Language develops an alternative, the parallel architecture, which
offers far richer opportunities for integration of the field."
Mesulam
M.-Marsel. 1998. "From
sensation to cognition." Brain. 121, 1013-1052, found July 2,
2005 PDF http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/121/6/1013. Mesulam
does not obviate the traditional perspective that places language primarily in
Broca/Wernecke, Geschwind. Instead, he adds to that model an in-out system that
focuses a large proportion of linguistic assignment, storage and processing at
the sensory and limbic sets. Note that the system is most fully realized in words
that prompt to the auditory and visual (A and V in illustration to the right,
in which the limbic/paralimbic is displayed in yellow) sets.
"
Language is based on a special kind of relationship between sensation and cognition.
It allows the formulation and communication of experiences, thoughts and memories
through the mediation of arbitrary symbols known as words. The arbitrary associations
between word and meaning eventually enter the realm of consolidated knowledge
and, as in the case of familiar face and object recognition, become coordinated
by transmodal nodes outside the limbic system. The encoding and activation of
associations related to language follow principles of organization that are quite
analogous to those involved in object recognition and explicit memory."
Excerpt:
A growing movement in cognitive science views consciousness and cognition
as self-organizing systems involving emotion and sensory-motor agency (e.g. Damasio
1994, 1999; Clark 1996; Glenberg, 1997; Hurley 1998). The view that cognition
is best understood as embodied is replacing models involving amodal symbol systems
like the arbitrary, intrinsically meaningless symbols of computer programs, which
notoriously fail to explain commonsense reasoning and consciousness. The embodied-cognition
approach sees such behavior as extensions of the animal=s value-laden interaction
with its environment. How can abstract reasoning (e.g. logic and mathematics)
make use of bodily action abilities? Briefly: sensorimotor imagery, conscious
or semiconscious activated memory traces of the experiences of performing basic
actions, functions not only in action contemplation and planning but also in the
mental manipulation of objects in abstract reasoning. Abstract thought builds
on basic action schemas: bodies interacting with objects in space (e.g. Huttenlocher
1968). To those claiming to lack such imagery, it can be argued that such images
are not necessarily fully conscious, and brain imaging studies are now available
that can decide such matters. Actions require motivation. Even covert attention
shifts depend on emotional interests of the organism; subcortical structures such
as the amygdala, hippocampus and the hypothalamus influence voluntary attention
mechanisms in the anterior cingulate. Actions imagined but not performed are both
activated and inhibited in the frontal lobes and motor cortex; inhibition, controlled
in large part by the hypothalamus, allows action images to be consciously experienced
(Jeannerod 1998) along with the emotional values associated with the actions. The
combination of the above approach with recent work on emotion is powerful, allowing
the formation of a global theory of brain function in which dynamic interactions
among brain areas and brain events can be mapped at many levels of organization.
An important prediction of the approach is that brain mechanisms once thought
devoted to motor activity are also active in emotional and cognitive activities.
Our example is the cerebellum. As we shall see, it appears that the cerebellum
is not only a coordinator of motor actions, but also of reasoning and, most recently
discovered, of emotional with cognitive states. If reasoning and other cognitive
activities make use of motor schemas, this is exactly what one would expect. The
cerebellum appears to be not just an organ for the coordination of actual motor
activities, but also for coordinating the output of both cortical and subcortical
structures involved in affect-laden cognitive activity at all levels.
Pinker,
Steven. Jackendoff, Ray. The Faculty of Language: What's Special about it? Cognition,
in press (2005) xx (xxxx) 1–36. (Preprint). We
examine the question of which aspects of language are uniquely human and uniquely
linguistic in light of recent suggestions by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch that the
only such aspect is syntactic recursion, the rest of language being either specific
to humans but not to language (e.g., words and concepts) or not specific to humans
(e.g., speech perception). We find the hypothesis problematic. It ignores the
many aspects of grammar [grammar here is used as a synonym with language, not
as that are not recursive, such as phonology, morphology, case, agreement, and
many properties of words. It is inconsistent with the anatomy and neural control
of the human vocal tract. And it is weakened by experiments suggesting that speech
perception cannot be reduced to primate audition, that word learning cannot be
reduced to fact learning, and that at least one gene involved in speech and language
was evolutionarily selected in the human lineage but is not specific to recursion.
The recursion-only claim, we suggest, is motivated by Chomsky’s recent approach
to syntax, the Minimalist Program, which de-emphasizes the same aspects of language.
The approach, however, is sufficiently problematic that it cannot be used to support
claims about evolution. We contest related arguments that language is not an adaptation,
namely that it is “perfect,” nonredundant, unusable in any partial form, and badly
designed for communication. The hypothesis that language is a complex adaptation
for communication which evolved piecemeal avoids all these problems. Before
we can study language, we are faced with an immediate problem that may strike
you as very odd in this day and age. Just what is language?
I discuss three orientations to what the word "thinks" might mean, the mentalist,
the behavioral, and the avowal orientations, and explain some variations of each.
I urge that mapping out thinking in this way allows us to examine some important
issues that escape us with more familiar theories (e.g., mind-brain identity theory,
the thesis of intentionality, etc.) and that these have important implications
for theorists in the social sciences. I argue that psychological behaviorists
often turn out to be philosophical mentalists in disguise, and that a position
of philosophical behaviorism is profoundly different from the sort of behaviorism
familiar to psychologists. I shall concentrate on variations of three orientations
to what thinking is, and to what words like "thinking," "thinks," and "thought"
mean. Each has its merits and its weaknesses.
One
treats thinking in terms of private mental events, inner processes or occurrences
or states. According to a second orientation,
what it is to think such-and-such is to have a tendency to behave in a certain
range of ways appropriate to the application of that term. And
according to a third orientation - a close cousin of the second - the person who
thinks such-and-such is the person who is prepared to say that he or she thinks
such-and-such.
Stromswold, K. 2005.
"Genetic specificity of linguistic
heritability."(PDF File) In A. Cutler (Ed.), Twenty-First Century
Psycholinguistics: Four Cornerstones. Mahwah NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/~karin/GeneticSpecificity.pdf Is
there a language gene (or genes)? We can learn a great deal about how language
works by looking at problem areas, and have been doing so at least since Paul
Broca. Stromswold's work is with twins, and is highly technical. In short, she
has found that certain kinds of specific language impairment (SLI) is heritable.
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