The Impact of Indian Warfare Tactics on the Development of the United States Army

by

Bradley R. Nelson

Throughout history, when two or more armed groups oppose one another in battle, certain tactics are transferred from one to the other. These tactics are usually perceived by either group as superior to their own. This process of transferring tactics often occurs over a length of time, and usually encompass a number of conflicts between the groups. This is a natural phenomenon for armed forces that mimics the Darwinian Theory of Evolution; the strongest survive, the weak die. For a group to become the strongest in armed conflict, it must employ superior tactics and doctrine over its enemy. One method that an armed force uses to become stronger is to adapt the superior tactics of its enemy, incorporating them into its own doctrine.

Today, the United States Army is undoubtedly the strongest armed force in the world. This has not occurred without the Army also adapting tactics used by forces which opposed it throughout its development. One such opposing force were the American Indians. The history of opposition between these two groups can be traced back to the conflicts that occurred between the Amerindians and the English Colonists, whose militias were the ancestor of the U.S. Army.

The colonial militia was an institution of the English that was imported to their colonies in the New World in the sixteenth century. The colonial militias thrived, however, as those of England faded into relative non-existence in the seventeenth century while a new, professional army was developed in their place. No colony could afford to develop a professional armed force because every able-bodied man had to devote all his energy to the economic survival of the colony. As a result, a professional army never arose in the colonies, rather all of them retained the old English principle of universal obligation to military service so that a military body of armed civilians could be mustered to defend it in times of need (Weigley 4).

The militia was strictly a local institution to a colony's townships or counties. They consisted of males usually between the age of sixteen and sixty, who were obliged to keep weapons in their homes and be prepared to be called in the event of Indian attack. Periodically throughout the year, the militias were called to train at their local county or town seat (Bell 28). Although the local militia trained together, they rarely fought together. Whenever a colony was threatened, the government of the colony directed the militia commander of the locality that was threatened to assemble his men. This commander would then muster the most able of his militia, usually the youngest, in the number he thought he would need. This was also similar to the process used to form a militia for an expedition into Indian country. Upon completion of the defense of the colony or the expedition, the men would immediately disband and return to their homes (Bell 29).

In the early days of the militias, though the value of their training was minimal in respect to that of their contemporary European professionals, the militiamen were competent Indian fighters. This was due in part to the nature of frontier life. Males were required to develop skill in the use of firearms from an early age, as hunting was the primary source of food in almost all areas of the colony. Also, living in the woodlands of America required that the colonists become competent woodsmen, which allowed them to naturally emulate the Indians' tactical use of the woods in combat (Weigley 9).

This emulation of tactics used by the Indians was not a wholly natural occurrence; a result of the colonists' adaption of European warfare to the geography of the New World. Rather, in the early days of the colonies, they attempted to strictly adhere to the tactics and methods the Europeans were using. This method of warfare relied upon mass formations of troops and a variety of intricate maneuvers. It was developed by the new professional armies of Europe, with their skilled warriors who could devote large amounts of time towards honing the skills necessary for their implementation. The colonists, naturally part-time warriors, did not possess the time, or have the requisite discipline, to hone their skills to appropriately master these tactics. Also, as the colonists quickly discovered, the European method of warfare was more suited for the open battlefields of Europe and its large-scale conflicts, not the dense woodlands of America and the small-scaled warfare that took place between the colonists and Indians (Overy 3).

The Indians' method of warfare was quite different from that of the Europeans. Unlike the European method which relied heavily on formations and a rigid command structure, the Indians' system was highly individualistic. Whenever Indians saw the need to conduct war, a group of warriors would unite into war bands under a war chief and proceed to the target of their animosity. In a battle, the each warrior would take-on a single opponent, without regard to their comrades and without direction from the chief. They often immediately proceeded to hand-to-hand combat with the opponent when the opposition was visibly at a disadvantage. Otherwise, they would initiate combat with ranged warfare and then move in to fight hand-to-hand once they believed they had the advantage (Bell 27).

Indians would avoid all-out, pitched combat, instead seeking to quietly advance upon the enemy and initiate a surprise attack. This surprise attack often manifested as a raid upon outlying colonial settlements, or as an ambush upon colonials traveling in the woodlands. To effectively conduct these attacks, the Indians employed scouts and the tactics of stealth, concealment, and cover. The scouts would allow the Indians to not only to effectively track their opponents, but also provide them with a means of gathering intelligence on their enemy (Bell 27). Stealth was perfected by the Indians by effectively learning how to move silently in the forests and also avoid leaving signs of their presence.

The Indians' use of stealth was also enhanced by their use of concealment and cover. Concealment is a tactic used by warriors to make them less visible to their opponent by blending into the terrain. Indians usually dressed in earth-toned garments and used paints on their bodies that accomplished this. Cover is a tactic whereby a warrior will use the terrain or man-made objects to avoid being seen, or made an easy target for his enemy in ranged warfare. Whereas the Europeans fought in the open, the Indians often fought from behind trees or rock formations, making them harder targets for the militiamen to shoot or even see.

The early militiamen quickly recognized the superiority of the Indians' tactics and implemented them. They began to use scouts to detect the Indians before they could affect an ambush or surprise attack. Also, during expeditions into the Indian territory, the militiamen would employ stealthy movement, and conduct ambushes and raids upon them (Ovary 3). Additionally, in combat the militias would not fight in the tight, controlled formations demanded by the European style of warfare, instead opting for the open formations of the Indians, and employing the tactics of cover and concealment (Bell 27). In effect, the European concept of warfare was practically thrown-out by the militias as ineffective in combat with the Indians.

Unfortunately, the trend of the militias to adapt the Indian tactics fell into decline. This occurred as the frontier was slowly being pushed to the west. As the regions east of the frontier became more civilized, the militias there began losing their skills in forestry and shooting. Also, the commanders of the militias became more educated in military ways of the period, which came from manuals imported from Europe. Therefore, the formalized teachings of the European method of warfare enjoyed a resurgence in the colonies (Weigley 10). Additionally, as these areas became less frequented by Indian attack, the training days for the militias were reduced from once per week to once per month (and even once per year, in some cases). Often the training conducted on the days became less disciplined, and many times these days became no more than a gathering of locals for festivities (Bell 29).

An illustration of the effect of the declining Indian-fighting skills of the militias can be seen during King Philip's War (1675-1678), when the colonial militias in New England were hampered in their fight against the Wampanoag tribe. The Indians repeatedly dealt severe blows to the colonists by exploiting their poor scouting and reconnaissance methods. Many expeditions launched by the colonials never succeeded, as the Indians constantly ambushed the colonials while they marched to their objective. The only means the colonials had to circumvent the Indians' tactics were to hire friendly Indians to do the scouting, and even much of the fighting (Weigley 11).

Over the next seventy-four years, from 1689 to 1763, four major conflicts occurred in Europe involving the British, French, and Spanish. In each of these conflicts the British sent Regulars to America to conduct warfare against their enemy's interests there. These Regulars would be augmented by the colonial militias in most operations. The effect on the militias was to further distance them from their traditional Indian-fighting role to that more accorded to European conflict. During these wars, the British strategy was to attack the centers of French power, which were a number of citadels they had constructed in their territory. This was very characteristic of the European method of war. However, the French used some methods typical of European fighting, but they also incorporated Indian fighting methods, too. In fact, the French relied heavily upon their Indian allies, either to augment their own forces or conduct combat on their behalf.

The defeat of British General Braddock's expedition in 1755 exemplified the inferiority of European methods in the New World. Braddock was in charge of a component of 2,200 men, composed of British Regulars and a small contingent of militiamen, sent to capture Fort Duquesne, a French citadel that threatened Virginia and Pennsylvania. The men marched in standard column formation from Alexandria, Virginia towards the fort (near present-day Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania). About seven miles from their objective, a force of French and Indians ambushed the advance guard, who immediately fled back to the main force, causing mass confusion. The French and Indian forces stealthfully pursued them, eventually surrounding Braddock's force, and then ambushed them. The British, who could barely even see their enemy that was concealed in the forest behind brush and tree, were decimated. Braddock continually tried to organize his men into firing lines, as European doctrine taught, but the confusion was too great for them to mass any effective fire on their hidden enemy (Coakley 18).

This battle not only marked the beginning of the French and Indian War, but also it marked a turning point in the British fighting methods used in the New World. The lesson they learned was that tactics and formations had to be adapted to the terrain and type of enemy that was faced. Also, Regulars, when used in the forest, would have to travel faster (by traveling lighter with less equipment) and take advantage of cover, concealment, and surprise (Coakley 20). As a result, the light infantry unit was developed. This type of infantry was composed of Regulars, but they operated as smaller units that used loose formations, providing for flexibility and mobility in forested areas.

The most significant type of light infantry that was developed, and evident only in America, was the Ranger. In the British Army in America, Rangers were the military unit that was most adapted to the environment. They were very lightly equipped and dressed in uniforms that blended into the undergrowth of the forests. They moved like the Indians; far ahead of larger units of Regulars, collecting intelligence, detecting ambushes, and conducting raids upon the enemy (Overy 4). Except for their light skin, they could almost be mistaken for Indians.

During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Army was formed and developed along the British standard. The leaders recognized that they had to develop a conventional army that would be capable of fighting in open, as well as forested, areas. Therefore, as a whole, the Continental Army was an army not unlike those in Europe at the time, and fought with the same tactics used by the Europeans. However, the militias, with their Indian-style tactics, continued to exist, and often they engaged British Regulars on their own, or in conjunction with the Continental Army.

This is not to say that the Army had no traces of influence by the Indian tactics the militias were using. In fact, there was a light infantry corps that was formed by the direction of General Washington. This corps became the most elite body in the Continental Army. The soldiers in this unit would perform duties such as skirmishing: fanning out ahead of the army to engage the enemy before the Regulars arrived. Usually, they would attack from behind cover, and they would move quickly and stealthfully, to whittle away at the enemy before the full battle took place. In addition to this light infantry corps, the Continental Army also had small units of Rangers that operated like those the British used in the French and Indian War (Mahon 9).

After the Revolution, the Continental Army was disbanded, and reliance for national defense once again fell upon the militia. There was much debate over whether to create a standing army for the new nation, and until the War of 1812, the opponents of the idea were largely victorious. As a result of the War of 1812, the government realized the necessity of a standing army, as individual militias were undisciplined, poorly trained, and ill-equipped. Over the next forty years, the army developed mainly along European lines, eschewing many of the Indian-derived tactics the Continental Army had employed. However, small units of light infantry did remain to provide skirmishing in front of the advancing army in combat. Also, some army units occasionally employed raiding tactics (using stealth and surprise) to combat the Indians.

During the Civil War, warfare underwent a change that reintroduced many of the Indian tactics. As a result of the incorporation of the rifle as the main infantry weapon, the mass infantry formations of Europe became literal deathtraps. As a result, the infantry became more diffused, and often fighting was done behind cover (Fennel 67). Also, scouting was employed by both sides, primarily to gather intelligence on the enemy rather than to track them. Skirmishers also were used widely ahead of the advancing masses of troops as they had been in the Revolution. In the western areas of the War, the confederates employed units that conducted raids that used tactics similar to the old Rangers.

One result of the Civil War was the incorporation of cover and concealment tactics into the established U.S. doctrine of warfare. Cover became important as the weapons of war became more deadly. The mass formations that had been so evident in western warfare since the 1500s became obsolete. Over the next fifty years, these formations became replaced by smaller formations that fired from behind cover, both in the offensive and the defensive. By the time of the First World War, the sight of large armies advancing in line became obsolete (Mahon 48). Today, the basic tactic of advancing is that as one soldier moves forward to cover, another fires at the enemy from cover behind him. Once the first soldier reaches cover, he fires while the other moves up. This leap-frogging continues until the objective is reached (United States 345).

Concealment made a comeback in the form of uniform color. Bright, colorful uniforms were phased out and replaced by earth-tone colors that blended the wearer into his surroundings, making a harder target for the enemy. These earth-toned uniforms were gradually replaced by camouflage-colored uniforms during the Vietnam War in the 1960s, and they are still in use today. Also, concealment through stealthy movement and conduct to avoid detection by the enemy became part of the Army doctrine (United States 393).

During World War II, the U.S. Army created units that specialized in certain forms of warfare. Three of these unit types integrated the methods and tactics used by the Rangers of old. They were the 1^st Special Service Force (1^st SSF), 5307^th Composite Unit (Provisional) ("Merrill's Marauders"), and the U.S. Army Rangers. The 1^st SSF was a unit formed to conduct warfare behind enemy lines, particularly in the mountains of Europe. Merrill's Marauders were created to conduct jungle warfare along the Ledo Road in Burma. The Rangers were established as a number of light infantry units that could conduct raids deep into enemy territory (Mahon 59). Each of these units utilized the tactics of the old Rangers; operating far ahead of regular troops, deep in enemy territory, using stealth and surprise. These tactics are known today as Unconventional Warfare. Merrill's Marauders were disbanded, the Rangers are still in existence, and the 1^st SSF has been replaced by the 1^st Special Forces, the "Green Berets."

The fact that the tactics of cover, concealment, stealth, raiding, and skirmishing are an integral part of the formal doctrine of the Army, proven in war, stands as testament to their superiority. These tactics cannot be attributed to the Europeans' influence upon the New World; no European form of warfare exhibited these characteristics. Only the Indians' form of warfare had them. Therefore, the Indians' warfare tactics had an obvious impact upon the development of the U.S. Army.

Works Cited

Bell, William G., et al, comps. American Military History. Army Historical Ser. Washington: GPO, 1989.

Coakley, Robert W., and Stetson Conn. The War of the American Revolution. Washington: GPO, 1975.

Fennell, Jr., Charles C. "The Civil War: The First Modern War." The American Military Tradition. Ed. John M. Carroll and Colin F. Baxter. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources,Inc., 1993. 3-22.

Mahon, John K., and Romana Danysh. Infantry Part I. Army Lineage Ser. Washington: GPO, 1972.

Overy, David H. "The Colonial Wars and the American Revolution." The American Military Tradition. Ed. John M. Carroll and Colin F. Baxter. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources,Inc., 1993. 3-22.

United States. Dept. of the Army. Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks - Skill Level 1. Washington: GPO, 1990.

Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1984.